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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Respondent agrees with the Appellant's statement of the Nature of the Case. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Following the hearing on this matter before the Idaho Industrial Commission (herinafter 
"Commission"), Referee Rinda Just entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
November 5, 2007. R., pp. 31-50. On November 20, 2007, the Commission entered an Order 
adopting the Referee's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and specifically ordered 
that the Claimant was totally and permanently disabled under the odd lot doctrine prior to her 
December 2002 industrial accidents. R., p. 53. As a result, all other issues, including the 
Claimant's claims against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (hereinafter "ISIF"), were 
rendered moot. Id. Thereafter, the Commission denied the Claimant's Motion for 
Reconsideration and ordered that the Claimant was not entitled to any permanent partial 
impairment for her December 2002 accidents. R., pp. 69-70. 
C. Statement of the Facts 
1. The Claimant's Pre-Existing Disease and Chronic Pain 
At the time of the hearing, the Claimant was 47 years old. Tr., p. 96, L. I. Following a 
series of work-related injuries in 1991, the Claimant was diagnosed with and has been affiicted 
by Charcot Marie Tooth Disease (hereinafter "CMT") a hereditary, progressive neuropathy. Tr., 
p. 32, LI. 20-25; p. 33, LI. 1-8; p. 44, LI. 19-23 . In the Claimant's case, her CMT is severely 
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painful, which required the use of "large doses" of narcotics since 1997. Prior to her 
employment with SL Start -- the Employer in the instant case -- the Claimant was taking 
Oxycontin, which is a time release form of Oxycodone designed to give continuous relief to her 
chronic pain caused by the CMT. Tr., p. 53, LI. 1-21. She was taking Oxycontin 3 - 4 times per 
day as far back as ! 996 due to her CMT. Tr., 53, L. 12. In addition to high doses of Oxycontin, 
the Claimant was also prescribed hydrocodone for "breakthrough" pain. Tr., p. 54, LI. 20-25; p. 
55, LI. 1-15. She took hydrocodone regularly; in November of 2001, one year before her 
employment with SL Start, claimant was prescribed 7.5 mg. of hydrocodone and 500 mg. of 
Tylenol every 4 hours for pain in addition to her Oxycontin. Employer/Surety Ex. B, p. 140. 
The Claimant's pain due to her progressive CMT increased in the year prior to her 
employment with SL Start. During that time the Claimant's intake of Oxycontin for pain due to 
her CMT doubled. For example, in 2001 she was prescribed 20 mg of Oxycontin, 2-4 times per 
day, but Dr. Carraher did not feel that was sufficient to control her pain. Tr., p. 60; p. 61, LI. 1-8; 
Employer/Surety Ex. B., p. 142. Therefore, in July of 2002, 5 months before her accident, she 
was prescribed 40mg of Oxycontin, 3-4 times per day due to her CMT. Tr., p. 61, Ll. 15-21; p. 
62, LI. 12-23; Employer/Surety Ex. B, p. 160. Dr. Carraher admitted that these were "large 
doses" of narcotics. Tr., p. 84, Ll. 1-3. In 2001, she was also prescribed Soma, a muscle 
relaxant, 350 mg pills, 3 pills per day for muscle tension related, in part, to low back pain. Tr., 
pp. 57-58; Employer/Surety Ex. B, p. 141. 
2. The Claimant's Pre-Existing Permanent Physical Restrictions and 
Employment 
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The Claimant had numerous permanent physical restrictions imposed upon her prior to 
her employer with SL Start. Due to complications from her right foot fusion surgery and 
hardware removal, on August 27, 1996, her foot and ankle surgeon, Dr. Hansen, opined that the 
Claimant would only be able to work in sedentary employment the rest of her life. R., p. 37; ISIF 
Ex. 9, p. 308. In 1997 Dr. Chiu, a pain specialist who treated the Claimant, indicated that her 
severe pain prevented her from working full-time. Employer/Surety Ex. H, p. 3. In a January 9, 
1997 letter to the Claimant's counsel Michael Verbillis, the Claimant's main treating physician, 
Dr. Carraher indicated that she was disabled and that any future work should be part-time, 
primarily sedentary with minimal ambulation. Tr., p.85, Ll. 9-25; p. 86, Ll. 1-9; Employer/Surety 
Ex. 14, p. 672. In May 1997, Dr. Carraher limited the Claimant to lifting 20 lbs., no prolonged 
usage of her arms and no prolonged walking. Tr., p. 227, Ll. 2-10. Since her pre-existing CMT 
also affected her hands and grip strength, in 2000 Dr. Carraher restricted the Claimant from 
repetitive work with her upper extremities. Tr., p. 68, Ll. 16-24; Employer/Surety Ex. B., p. 107. 
Then, in 200 I the year before she obtained her employment with SL Start, due to the progressive 
nature of her CMT, Dr. Carraher restricted the Claimant to working only 8-12 hours per week. 
Tr., p. 71, LL 4-11; Employer/Surety Ex. B, p. 144. 
In spite of these part-time, sedentary restrictions, the Claimant found limited employment 
in part-time, short term positions with accommodating employers. For example, in 1997, the 
Claimant started to work for Dr. Carraher, who was starting a new medical practice, as a medical 
assistant. Tr., p.106, LL 19-23. Dr. Carraher allowed the Claimant to work at her own pace due 
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to her CMT and he admitted that she worked part-time with accommodation, which included a 
special chair, accommodation of her physical needs, limited hours, and allowing her to rest when 
she became fatigued. ISIF Ex. 14, p. 504; Tr., p. 75, Ll. 3-6; p. 81, LL 17-25; p. 82, Ll. 1-4. 
When Dr. Carraher's practice became busier, the Claimant could no longer perform her work 
duties for him with these accommodations. Tr., p. 82, LL 5-12. 
The Claimant then began a series of part-time, temporary jobs. Following the 
termination of her employment with Dr. Carraher, she took a temporary job with the CDA Hand 
Therapy clinic. Tr., pp. I 08, Ll. 20-25; p. 109, Ll. 1-5. She then worked a few months for Dr. 
Beaton, an ENT, while his regular medical assistant was on maternity leave. Tr., p. 111, Ll. 1-14. 
She was unemployed for about one year and then found work with Lakeland Family Medicine. 
Employer/Surety Ex. N. She worked there part-time for approximately one year and was forced 
to quit as the practice and job demands grew. Tr., p. 111, Ll. 19-25; p. 112, LL 1-8. During her 
employment with Lakeland Family Medicine, Dr. Carraher restricted the Claimant to 8-12 hours 
of work per week. Tr., p. 71, LL 4-11; Employer/Surety Ex. B. p. 144. 
3. Expert Opinions Regarding Claimant's Pre-Existing Odd Lot Status 
Following the hearing, the Claimant's own vocational expert, Tom Moreland, testified 
that based upon the Claimant's part-time, sedentary restrictions prior to her employment with SL 
Start, she was totally and permanently disabled under Idaho's worker's compensation laws. He 
testified as follows: 
Q. And somebody who is restricted in that manner, restricted to 
eight to 12 hours per week, sedentary work, no prolonged sitting or 
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standing, no repetitive hand movements, no grip strength, but who 
has experience working in the medical field, are they able to 
compete in the regular labor market in north Idaho prior to 2002? 
A. Restate that, would you. 
Q. Right. 
A. It looks -- well, I think you pretty well disabled everybody from 
working. 
Q. So if those restrictions are imposed on an individual who lives 
in north J daho, those restrictions would pretty much make them 
unemployable in north Idaho without substantial accommodations 
by an employer, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Someone who had those restrictions, would they be, in your 
eyes, totally and permanently disabled under Idaho law as you 
understand it for purposes of workers' comp -
A. The way you present it, yes. 
Deposition of Tom Moreland dated January 30, 2007 (hereinafter "Moreland depo."), p. 40 L. 24 
- p. 42, L. 11 ( emphasis added). 
Douglas Crum, the Employer/Surety's vocational expert, testified at hearing and agreed 
with Mr. Moreland. He opined that, based upon his review of the Claimant's medical records, 
her pre-injury restrictions related to her CMT and ankle fusion, and his knowledge of her labor 
market, she was totally and permanently disabled prior to October 2002 when she became 
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employed with SL Start. Tr., p. 231. He testified that the Claimant was an odd-lot, totally 
disabled worker prior to her employment with SL Start and that she was not capable of 
competitive full time or part time employment. Tr., pp. 233 - 234. He added that the Claimant's 
post-accident restrictions were identical to her pre-injury restrictions, namely that she was 
restricted to part-time sedentary work. Tr., p. 235, LI. 3-8. The Commission specifically 
embraced this last point in its Order. R., p. 48. 
4. Claimant's Employment at SL Start 
On October 24, 2002, the Claimant applied for work with SL Start and filled out an 
Applicant Certification of Capability. Employer/Surety Ex. L, p. 19. On this form, the Claimant 
certified to SL Start that, among other things, she was able to lift and transfer non-ambulatory 
individuals requiring her to bear up to 50 lbs of unbalanced weight, stand or sit for one hour at a 
time, and climb stairs carrying 10 lbs. Id. The Claimant, despite making this certification in 
order to obtain employment with SL Start, testified that she was not capable of these tasks. Tr., p. 
181, LI. 13-25; p. 182, L. 1. In fact, prior to her employment with SL Start, Dr. Carraher 
restricted the Claimant from prolonged standing or walking due to her CMT and the associated 
problems in her legs. Tr., p. 69, Ll. 15-21. She was hired by SL Start worked with ambulatory 
clients as an accommodation to her beginning in November 2002. Tr., p. 113, LI. 4-12; 
Employer/Surety Ex. L, p. 64. 
During her approximately one month tenure at SL Start, the Claimant earned $7.00 per 
hour and averaged 24 hours of work per week. Id. Within a short period of time, she suffered 
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two injuries, the first on December 5, 2002 and the second on December 9, 2002. Following her 
accidents, the Claimant continued to work for SL Start until April 2004. Tr., p. 123, Ll. 5 - 12. 
On July 15, 2004, one of her treating physicians, Dr. Kody, released her to return to her normal 
occupation regarding her shoulder injury. Tr., p. 168, LI. 14 - 20; Ex. C, p. 22. Dr. Carraher did 
not disagree with Dr. Kody's release. Tr., p. 73, LL 12-25. The Claimant admitted that none of 
her treating physicians placed any restrictions on her due to any perceived back injury. Tr., p. 
169, LL 12- 23. Dr. Carraher admitted that the Claimant's prescription drug intake, which was 
verified by her prescription records, including Oxycontin, hydrocodone and Soma following her 
accidents was identical to her intake in the months prior to her accidents. Tr., p. 55, L. 1- p. 56, 
L. 14; p. 57, LL 1-25, p. 62, LL 1-11. 
The Claimant was subsequently examined by Drs. Adams and Bozarth at the request of 
the Idaho State Insurance Fund. Drs. Adams and Bozarth opined that, following their 
examination of the Claimant, she did not suffer any injuries in December of 2002 and as a 
consequence she did not suffer any permanent physical impairment. R., p. 42; Employer/ Surety 
Ex. 7, p. 0293. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Is the Commission's finding that the Claimant was totally and permanently 
disabled prior to her December 2002 accident(s) supported by substantial and 
competent evidence? 
2. Are Respondents Employer/Surety entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to 
I.A.R 11 and Talbot v. Ames Constr., 127 Idaho 648, 904 P.2d 560 (1995)? 
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ARGUMENT 
A. The Commission's Finding that the Claimant was Totally and 
Permanently Disabled Prior to her December 2002 Accidents is Supported by 
Substantial and Competent Evidence 
In her Brief, the Claimant implies that the facts do not support the Commission's finding 
that the Claimant was totally and permanently disabled pursuant to the odd lot doctrine prior to 
her accidents at SL Start. However, Respondents herein maintain that the crux of this appeal is 
that the Commission's finding of total and permanent disability prior to the claimant's December 
2002 accidents is supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
It is well settled that whether a claimant is totally and permanently disabled is a question 
of fact. Boley v. State, 130 Idaho 278, 280, 939 P.2d 854, 856 (1997). When the Supreme Couii 
reviews a decision from the Industrial Commission, it reviews questions of fact only to 
determine whether substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's findings. 
Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996). Substantial and competent 
evidence is "relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." 
Boise Orthopedic Clinic v. Idaho State Ins. Fund (In re Wilson), 128 Idaho 161, 164, 911 P.2d 
754, 757 (1996). The Supreme Court will not disturb the Commission's factual findings unless 
they are clearly erroneous. Spencer v. Al/press Logging, Inc., 134 Idaho 856, 11 P.3d 475 (2000). 
Finally, all facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to Respondents herein 
as they prevailed before the Industrial Commission. Stolle v. Bennett, 144 Idaho 44, _, 156 P.3d 
545, 548-49 (2007) 
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I. The Odd Lot Doctrine 
In cases such as this, where the claimant seeks to establish ISIF liability, Idaho Code § 
72-332(1) places the initial burden on the claimant to establish that her pre-existing impairment 
and her subsequent injuries combined to result in total permanent disability. Garcia v. JR. 
Simplot, 115 Idaho 966, 968, 772 P.2d 173, l 75 (1989); Bybee v. State, Industrial Special 
Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 76, 82, 921 P.2d 1200 (1996). However, if the claimant's total 
permanent disability predates the industrial injury, this requirement is not met. Bybee, 129 Idaho 
at 82. 
Therefore, in order to impose liability on the ISIF, the Claimant must establish that she 
was not an odd-lot worker prior to her employment with SL Start. She did so by showing that she 
was working regularly at a job at the time of injury. Bybee, 129 Idaho at 82. The analysis does 
not stop here. Once she met her burden, the ISIF must establish that she was an odd-lot worker 
even though employed at that time of her injury. Id 
A claimant falls within the odd-lot category if he or she was so injured that he or she can 
only perform services which are "so limited in quality, dependability, or quantity that a 
reasonably stable market for them does not exist." Arnold v. Splendid Bakery, 88 Idaho 455,463, 
401 P.2d 271, 276 (1965) (citing Crawford v. Nielson, 78 Idaho 526, 307 P.2d 229 (1957)); 
Lyons v. Industrial Special Indem. Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 406, 565 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1977). The 
ISIF must show that the claimant's actual employment was due to "a business boom, the 
sympathy of a particular employer or friends, temporary good luck, or a superhuman effort on 
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[her] part." Bybee, 129 Idaho at 82 ( quoting Lyons v. Industrial Special lndem. Fund, 98 Idaho 
403,406,565 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1977)). The ISIF must show that in light of the claimant's pre-
existing condition, the search for other suitable employment would have been futile. Id. As is 
shown below, there is substantial and competent evidence to support the Commission's finding 
that the Claimant was totally and permanently disabled as an odd lot worker prior to her 
employment with SL Start. 
2. The Claimant was an Odd Lot Worker Prior to Her Employment with SL 
Start 
An examination of the facts of record, coupled with the testimony of the vocational 
experts, establishes that the Claimant was an odd lot worker prior to her employment with SL 
Start. First, the Claimant's permanent restrictions prior to her accidents were identical to those 
following her accidents. Prior to her employment with SL Start, she was restricted to sedentary, 
part-time employment (actually Dr. Carraher restricted her to working only 8-12 hours per week) 
with no prolonged standing or walking, no prolonged usage of her arms and no repetitive work 
with her upper extremities due to the progressive nature of her CMT. Tr., p. 71, Ll. 4-11; Tr., p. 
68, Ll. 16-24; Tr., p. 227, Ll. 2-10; Tr., p.85, Ll. 9-25; p. 86, LI. 1-9. The Commission properly 
relied on these facts in reaching its decision: 
Fundamentally, Claimant's work limitations were the same both 
before and after her 2002 injuries. Even her own vocational expert 
could not identify any factors that substantively distinguish her 
condition before and after the 2002 accident. If Claimant was 
totally and permanently disabled at the time of bearing, then she 
was totally and permanently disabled before her 2002 accident. 
- lO -
R., p. 48. Moreover, as Claimant's own vocational expert testified, a person with the Claimant's 
pre-existing physical restrictions is totally and permanently disabled under Idaho's worker's 
compensation law: 
Q. Someone who had those restrictions, would tl1ey be, in your 
eyes, totally and permanently disabled under Idaho law as you 
understand it for purposes of workers' comp -
A. The way you present it, yes. 
Moreland depo., p. 42, LL 7 - 11. 
Just as the Claimant's restrictions did not change following her accidents, the 
Commission's finding of pre-existing odd lot status is supported by medical evidence, including 
her prescription records which show that her use of substantial amounts of narcotic pain 
medications and muscle relaxants due to her painful CMT remained the same following her 
accidents. Similarly, the Commission relied upon the examination findings of Drs. Adams and 
Bozarth that the Claimant did not suffer any injuries in December of 2002 and as a consequence 
she did not suffer any permanent physical impairment. R., p. 42; Employer/ Surety Ex. 7, p. 
0293. 
The Commission also considered the Claimant's sedentary, less than part-time 
employment in the years leading up to her employment with SL Start. The evidence of record 
supports a finding that the Claimant was employed by either sympathetic employers or 
temporary good luck. For example, Dr. Carraher was a sympathetic employer, which the 
Commission recognized. R., p. 47. Prior to the Claimant's employment with him, he certified to 
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an insurance company to a reasonable degree of medical probability that the Claimant was totally 
and permanently disabled, yet he still employed her. Tr., 67-68; Employer/Surety Ex. I 4, p. 662. 
He admitted that he accommodated her disability by allowing her to work at her own pace due to 
her CMT, he gave her a special chair, limited her hours, and allowed her to rest when she 
became fatigued. ISIF Ex. 14, p. 504; Tr., p. 75, LI. 3-6; p. 81, LI. 17-25; p. 82, LI. 1-4. 
Once she left Dr. Carraher's employ because he could not longer accommodate her 
disabilities, she was only able to find temporary employment on a less than part-time basis which 
the Commission took into account. R., 47. Her ability to find temporary, sedentary, less than 
part-time employment was the result of temporary good luck. She averaged l 0.67 hours per 
week working for Dr. Beaton while his assistant was on medical leave. Tr., p. 111, Ll. 1-14. At 
Lakeland Family Medicine she averaged 14.3 hours per week, but was forced to cut back her 
time to less than 8-12 hours per week in 2001. Tr., p. 230, Ll. I - 7. In each instance, her 
significant restrictions were accommodated by her employers; once they required more than 12 
hours per week she was terminated. 
SL Start also provided the claimant with significant accommodations. Even though the 
job required her to bear up to 50 lbs of unbalanced weight, stand or sit for one hour at a time, and 
climb stairs carrying 10 lbs., she admitted that she was not capable of these essential functions of 
the job. Tr., p. 181, Ll. 13-25; p. 182, L. 1. Therefore, SL Start accommodated her by allowing 
her to work with ambulatory client. Tr., p. 113, LL 4-12; Employer/Surety Ex. L, p. 64. 
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The Claimant's accommodating employers were similar to the sympathetic employers in 
Hamilton v. Ted Beamis Logging & Constr., 127 Idaho 221, 899 P.2d 434 (1995) and Bybee. In 
Hamilton, evidence of a sympathetic employer included special accommodations for Hamilton 
such as restricting his work to level ground and allowing him to take more breaks. Hamilton, 127 
Idaho at 224. In Bybee the Court found that there was substantial evidence to find that the 
claimant was employed by a sympathetic employer because she could barely perform light duty 
work in a job classified as medium duty. Bybee, 129 Idaho at 83. It is important to note that 
Bybee worked for several years in a full-time capacity prior to her second accident. In the 
present case, the claimant could only muster temporary, less than part-time employment with 
accommodating employers. 
The Claimant argues that the facts do not support a finding that she was an odd lot 
worker because she was able to hold down several jobs over a several year period. However, the 
mere fact that the Claimant worked for several years prior to her most recent accident does not 
preclude a finding that she was totally and permanently disabled prior to her December 
accidents. In Redman v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 138 Idaho 915, 71 PJd 1062 
(2003), this Court upheld the Commission's ruling that a claimant who had been gainfully 
employed for 6 years on a full-time basis following an initial injury, but who did not suffer any 
additional injury or impairment in a subsequent accident, save an aggravation of her original 
injury, was totally and permanently disabled prior to her second accident. In Redman, the 
claimant was a gas station clerk who suffered a back injury in 1987 resulting in restrictions of no 
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lifting more than 15 lbs. and no bending at the lnmbar spine. Id., 138 Idaho at 916. She then 
found employment with Maverik and was told by her supervisor to work as long as she could 
within her capacities and then to go home. Id. Following a second injury to her back in 1997, 
she sued the ISIF alleging that she her second injury combined with the first resulting in total 
permanent disability. The ISIF argued that her employment was due to a sympathetic employer, 
and that she failed to prove her recent accident when combined with her previous disability 
caused her total impairment. The ISIF based it argument on medical records which stated her 
most recent pain was due to an aggravation of a previous injury, not a new one. 
The Commission agreed, stating "The combination of medical and vocational records and 
opinions shows it more likely than not that Claimant's permanent disability before the 1997 
accident was no different than afterward." Id. at 918. This Court agreed with the Commission, 
stating that "it is not necessary to address the Commission's determination that Redman was 
otherwise unemployable but for a sympathetic employer" since she had not suffered any new 
injury. Id. The same rationale holds true here, where as in Redman, the medical evidence 
supports the conclusion Claimant did not suffer a new injury or any additional impairment. 
The evidence of record establishes that the Claimant had pre-existing restrictions to 
sedentary, less than part-time employment. These restrictions/limitations made her 
unemployable except as an odd-lot worker. The Claimant failed to produce any evidence that 
these restrictions changed following her industrial accidents. Saddled with these restrictions, her 
efforts to openly compete in the labor market were futile. Due to her restrictions and limited 
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tolerances for activity, she was only capable of obtaining extremely limited, temporary work in 
medical offices and required significant accommodation. As the Commission noted, since she 
suffered no change in her restrictions, pain, or any new injury, if she was totally disabled after 
her December 2002 accidents, she was totally disabled prior to them. R., pp. 48-49. Even her 
own expert agreed that her restrictions made her virtually unemployable without significant 
accommodations. Moreland depo., p. 41, LL 19 - 24. Moreover, vocational expert Douglas 
Crum testified that, based upon her restrictions and her labor market, the Claimant was an odd-
lot, totally disabled worker prior to her employment with SL Start and that she was not capable 
of competitive full time or part time employment. Therefore, there is substantial and competent 
evidence to support the Commission's finding that she was an odd-lot worker prior to her 
employment with SL Start. 
B. Since There Is Substantial and Competent Evidence to Support the 
Commission's Finding that the Claimant is an Odd Lot Worker, the "Two-Tiered" 
Apportionment Analysis Set Forth in Page v. McCain is Not Required 
The Claimant argues that this Court's recent decision in Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., _ 
Idaho _, 179 P.3d 269 (2008) requires that the Commission make a separate finding of the 
claimant's degree of permanent disability from all sources and then apportion disability between 
the pre-existing injury and the current injury. Appellant's Brief, p. 5. In Page, this Court made 
it clear that this apportionment analysis is required when the Commission apportions disability 
between a pre-existing condition and the current injury. Page, 179 P .3d at 271-272 ( discussing 
apportionment in the context of Idaho Code § 72-406 for pre-existing conditions where 
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permanent disability is less than total). However, as the Bybee and Hamilton decisions make 
clear, when a claimant is totally and permanently disabled prior to a subsequent accident, no 
apportionment analysis, e.g., apportioning liability/disability between the Employer/Surety and 
the ISIF under the Carey formula, is required. See Idaho Code§ 72-332; Bybee, 129 Idaho at 82; 
Hamilton, 127 Idaho at 225. 
In this case, as in Hamilton and Bybee, the Claimant was already totally disabled prior to 
her second accident. By definition her injuries from her second accident did not combine with 
her pre-existing impairments, so apportionment under the Carey formula is not required. The 
Carey formula is a mathematical formula developed by the Idaho Supreme Court in order to 
effectively administer the provisions of LC. § 72-332. Carey v. Clearwater County Rd. Dep't, 
I 07 Idaho I 09, 118, 686 P.2d 54, 63 (I 984). The Carey formula is only applicable when the 
preexisting injury combines with the current injury to create total and permanent disability. The 
purpose of this fonnula is to apportion liability such that employers are liable only to the extent 
of disability caused by the second industrial accident, with the remainder being paid by the ISIF. 
Id. at 117, 686 P.2d at 62. In Hamilton, the Supreme Court concluded that the Carey formula is 
inapplicable when the pre-existing impairment does not combine with the subsequent injury to 
result in total disability. 127 Idaho at 224-25, 899 P.2d at 437-38. In Bybee, the Supreme Court 
explained that in Hamilton "there was no question that pre-existing conditions did not combine 
with the subsequent injury since 'Hamilton was already totally and permanently disabled 
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[pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine] coming into the second injury."' 129 Idaho at 81 (quoting 
Hamilton, 127 Idaho at 225, 899 P.2d at 438.) 
Thus, this "two-tiered" analysis referred to by the Claimant is only applicable if 
apportionment is an issue. As the Bybee and Hamilton decisions make clear, apportionment is 
not required in this case as there is substantial and competent evidence to support the 
Commission's finding of total disability predating the second accident. 
Even if this Court were to require the "two-tiered" analysis referred to by the Claimant, 
the Commission's decision complies with this requirement. An examination of paragraphs 48 -
52 of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of law and Recommendation, establishes that the 
Commission compared the Claimant's pre and post injury restrictions, medication usage, and 
work limitations. R., pp. 46 - 48. Contrary to the Claimant's assertions in her Brief, this 
included an analysis of the Claimant's physical capabilities and restrictions pertaining to her 
pain, sitting, standing, walking, and lifting tolerances. Based upon this analysis -- which showed 
no difference in the Claimant's restrictions or prescription medication use following her 
December 2002 accidents -- the Commission concluded, in line with this Court's reasoning and 
decision in Redman, that the Claimant was totally disabled prior to her employment with SL 
Start. R., pp. 48 - 49. 
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C. Respondents Employer/Surety Are Entitled to Attorney Fees Pursuant to 
I.A.R 11 and Talbot v. Ames Constr., 127 Idaho 648, 904 P.2d 560 (1995) 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11.1, a party may be subject to sanctions if an appeal is 
brought frivolously and without foundation. "Under JAR Rule 11.1, sanctions will be awarded on 
appeal if the party requesting them proves:(!) the other party's arguments are not well grounded 
in fact, warranted by existing law, or made in good faith, and (2) the claims were brought for an 
improper purpose, such as unnecessary delay or increase in the costs of litigation." Frank v. 
Bunker Hill Co., 142 Idaho 126, 124 P.3d 1002, 1008 (2005). In Talbot v. Ames Constr., 127 
Idaho 648, 904 P.2d 560 (I 995), this Court held that all the claimant's attorney asked the Court 
to do on appeal was re-weigh the evidence and reach a different conclusion than that reached by 
the Commission and awarded attorney fees on appeal against the Claimant's counsel. 
As was the case in Talbot, all that the Claimant asked this Court to do is re-weigh the 
evidence and enter a new conclusion favorable to her. Her argument that the apportionment 
analysis set forth in Page is required in this case is clearly contrary to the Court's precedent in 
Bybee and Hamilton. In fact, Claimant devotes almost all of her brief arguing the facts and 
asking this Court to re-weigh the evidence. As such, Respondent herein is entitled to attorney 
fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's finding that the Claimant was totally disabled prior to her industrial 
accidents in December 2002 is supported by substantial and competent evidence and is 
consistent with well-settled Supreme Court precedent in Bybee, Hamilton, and Redman. The 
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Commission analyzed the following pertinent facts -- that the Claimant's sedentary, less than 
part-time physical restrictions were unaffected by her industrial accidents, her use of narcotic 
pain medications remained the same, and that she did not suffer any new injury or impairments 
due to her accidents -- and concluded that she was totally disabled prior lo employment with SL 
Start. Since the Bybee and Hamilton make it clear that no apportionment is necessary i /' the 
Claimant is totally disabled prior to her second accident, the Claimant's argument that the 
Commission is required to perfom1 an apportionment analysis has no merit. As a result, the 
Respondents herein respectfully request that this Court uphold the Commission's decisions and 
orders in their entirety. 
Dated this 7'11 day of August, 2008. 
By: 
Auc,USTINE & MCKEN7'.IE, PLLC 
Paul J. Augustinf - Of the Firm ·· -
Attorneys for Enipkiyfr/Surety - Respondent 
"·'-" 
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P.O. Box 854 
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